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IN PURSUIT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY
COMPLIANCE: SHOULD WE FLEX THE "PUBLIC
TRUST" ENHANCEMENT MUSCLE?
BRIAN HENDRICKS*

INTRODUCTION

In 1987 the U.S. Sentencing Commission adopted the United
States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G."). 1 The guidelines contain
a number of upward and downward sentencing departures based on
the factual circumstances and the conduct of individual defendants. 2
Federal courts have traditionally applied a sentencing enhancement for a violation of a public or private trust or use of a special
skill (the "public trust enhancement")3 to criminal acts by elected
officials or government employees, and to select non-governmental
actors that maintain custodial relationships or positions of power

*Brian M. Hendricks previously received a B.A. in Political Science and Economics
from Augustana College and a Masters Degree in Public Policy (MPP) in
Regulatory Policy and Policy Analysis from the College of William and Mary. The
author is a 2006 J.D. candidate at the William and Mary School of Law. School. He
would like to thank his wife Paige Hendricks for her constant patience and support
and the staff of the William andMary EnvironmentalLaw and Policy Review for
their tireless work, attention to detail, and unrelenting professionalism.
' Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (2000) and 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991-998 (2000) [hereinafter Sentencing Act of 1984]. The Sentencing Reform
Act created the United States Sentencing Commission which created the
U.S.S.G. in 1987.
2 United States Sentencing Commission, An Overview of the
FederalSentencing
Guidelines, http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview_2005.pdf (last visited
Sept. 21, 2005).
' U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.3 (2004) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.
Manual]. The commentary describes the types of relationships that constitute
positions of trust. The U.S.S.G. are codified in various sections of the United
States Code including titles 7, 15, 16, 18, 33, and 42. This Note utilizes the
citation format referring to specific U.S.S.G. sections rather than the
corresponding United States Code sections.
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over vulnerable individuals.4 Recently, however, several courts
ruled on the appropriateness of applying the public trust enhancement to the employees and agents of private regulated entities.
These decisions could result in the application of an additional
upward sentencing adjustment to the employees and agents of
private entities that commit environmental crimes. This Note
examines recent federal holdings involving the application of the
public trust enhancement to criminal activity in general, and in
particular to the actions of an employee or agent of a private
regulated entity6 such as the employees and agents involved in

United States v. Snook.7
Part I of this Note briefly examines ongoing efforts by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to adopt flexible
regulatory regimes,' including the measure known as the "Audit

U.S.S.G. Manual (2004) § 3B1.3 provides that
[i]f the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or
used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the
commission or concealment of the offense, increase by 2 levels.
This adjustment may not be employed if an abuse of trust or
skill is included in the base offense level or specific offense
characteristic. If this adjustment is based upon an abuse of a
position of trust, it may be employed in addition to an
adjustment under §3B1. 1 (Aggravating Role); if this adjustment
is based solely on the use of a special skill, it may not be
employed in addition to an adjustment under §3B1.1
(Aggravating Role).
5See infra Part III.
6
The term private regulated entity refers throughout this note to the employees
or agents of a private company subject to some form of state of federal
environmental regulatory framework. This distinction is important because the
public trust enhancement has been applied to private entities before, but as Part
II of the Note suggests, that application has been almost exclusively to
individuals with quasi-fiduciary duties. See infra Part II notes 97-102 and
accompanying text.
7 366 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 2004). See infra Part III.
8 Environmental Protection Agency Audit Policy Statement, Incentives for Self-

Policing:Discovery, Disclosure,Correction,and Preventionof Violations, 65 Fed.
Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000).
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Policy,"9 which became effective in January of 1996.1' The Note
discusses the Audit Policy and other programs involving selfreporting and remediation of violations, focusing on particular
compliance results and continuing criminal violations." An
understanding of the current incentives and penalties associated
with flexible regulatory approaches, as well as the compliance
results obtained through their use, is essential to evaluating the
potential value the public trust enhancement could have as a
compliance-seeking tool. 2
Part II of the Note examines the development of the
U.S.S.G. in general, and of the public trust enhancement in
particular. 3 The history of how federal courts have applied the
public trust enhancement provides important insight into the
appropriateness of extending the enhancement to the criminal
conduct of the employees and agents of private regulated entities.
This discussion is necessary to provide a backdrop against which
the extension of the public trust enhancement can be analyzed to
determine whether the extension is a reasonable progression in the
application of sentencing enhancements or a problematic overreaching by the courts.
Part III of the Note outlines the current state of the federal
Circuit Courts of Appeal concerning the application of the public
trust enhancement to the employees and agents of private
regulated entities. 4 Part III gives way to the final portion of the
Note, which discusses a number of arguments for and against the
extension of the public trust enhancement in the manner contemplated by the Seventh Circuit in the Snook case.' 5

9

Id.
'0 See infra Part I and notes 60-66.
"See infra Part
12 See infra Part
13 See infra Part
14 See infra Part
15 See infra Part

I and notes 72 and 73.
I and notes 60-74.
II and notes 83-97 and 100-06.
III, notes 109-64, and accompanying text.
IV, notes 165-221, and accompanying text.
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EVOLUTION OF SENTENCING ADJUSTMENTS IN THE
PROSECUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME

A.

The Early Years of EnvironmentalProsecution

The concept of federal environmental law is more than a
hundred years old; however, the most significant statutes are of
much more recent vintage. 6 Beginning in 1969 with the National
Environmental Policy Act,' 7 the federal government established a
commitment to defining and controlling behavior affecting the
natural environment.'" For a little over a decade, enforcement and
punishment activities consisted primarily of civil and administrative fines and penalties. 9 This began to change in 1980 when the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") created an Environmental Enforcement Section to prosecute "egregious violations" of federal
environmental law, marking the beginning of coordinated full-time
investigation and enforcement.2" The EPA followed this move by
creating the Office of Criminal Enforcement ("OCE") in January of
1981 and by staffing the office with twenty-three investigators two
years later.2 '
In the early years, the OCE lacked the staff and resources
necessary to cast a wide investigative and prosecutorial net. These
challenges resulted in the EPA limiting its efforts to the "most
serious forms of environmental misconduct."22 The EPA continued

16

Ethan H. Jessup, Environmental Crimes and Corporate Liability: The

Evolution of the Prosecutionof "Green" Crimes by Corporate Entities, 33 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 721, 726 (1999).

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (2000).
18 Jessup, supra note 16, at 726.
17

'9 See Judson W. Star, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA- The Origins of
Environmental Criminal Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 GEO.
WASH.
L. REV. 900, 904 (1991).
20

Id.

21
22

Jessup, supra note 16, at 726.
See Robert Adler & Charles Lord, EnvironmentalCrimes;Raising the Stakes,

59 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 781, 792 (1991). This essentially meant focusing on more
clandestine activities not within the "cognizance" of regular agency personnel.
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to toil under the strain of limited resources for almost a full decade
before Senator Joe Lieberman, a Democrat from Connecticut,
introduced the Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990.23 The Act called
for a fourfold increase in the number of criminal investigators and
the hiring of civil investigators to assist in the enforcement
process.24 This appears to be something of a philosophical turning
point in the commitment of resources to enforcement. Due at
least in part to the limited resources available in the early years
of the EPA's enforcement program, sentences for environmental
crimes were largely in the form of large fines for corporations, as
opposed to meaningful prison time for offenders.2 6
B.

Development of Sentencing Guidelines

Throughout the early 1980s, the DOJ and the EPA were
limited not only by the resources available to undertake investigations and prosecutions, but also by the limited sentencing flexibility provided in federal environmental statutes.27 Prior to the
adoption of the U.S.S.G. in 1987,28 the criminal penalties for a
particular environmental violation were determined by both the
criminal sanctions contained in the relevant statute and by
individual judicial discretion.2 9 The penalties provided under
statutes were inflexible, and at least one result was the propensity
for judges to sentence defendants to the statutory penalty and

23
24

Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, S. 2176, 101st Cong. (1990) (enacted).
Helen J. Brunner, Environmental Criminal Enforcement: A Retrospective

View, 22 ENVTL. L. 1315, 1325 (1992).
25

Cf. Brunner, supra note 24, at 1325.

26

Id. at 1338.

27

Cf. Adler, supra note 22, at 797-98 (discussing recent changes to environ-

mental statutes that increase the type and severity of penalties, which were not
available in the DOJ or EPA in the early 1980s).
28 See Sentencing Act of 1984, supra note 1.
29 Cf. Adler, supra note 22, at 798-99 (discussing how the adoption of the
U.S.S.G. in 1987 curtailed the judicial reduction of sentences noting, "[J]udges
now cannot impose a sentence only to suspend it in favor of a period of
probation" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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then order probation in lieu of jail time.3" As a result, defendants
convicted for environmental crimes in the late 1970s and early
1980s did not receive harsh sentences and spent "little, if any, time
in jail."31
When implemented in 1987, the U.S.S.G. created a system of
base offense levels for particular crimes and a framework for adjusting sentences upward or downward based on the particular facts of
a crime and a defendant's conduct in the commission of the offense.32
The U.S.S.G. effectively eliminated the suspended sentence by taking
away a large amount of judicial discretion.33 Under the guidelines, a
judge could order probation only where the Sentencing Commission
provided a minimum prison term of zero months for an offense.34
Because the guidelines were binding on sentencing courts, 3 5 sentences
that departed from the guideline requirements were subject to appeal
by both prosecutors and defendants.
For the first time, the punishment for environmental crimes
(and crimes more generally) depended more upon the conduct of
the defendant, and the extent of the injury to the public or
individuals caused by the criminal activity, than on the individual
discretion of judges. 36 This was an important development in the
prosecution of environmental crimes because the ability to secure

30
31

Id.
Colleen C. Murnane, CriminalSanctionsfor DeterrenceArea Needed Weapon,

but Self-InitiatedAuditing is Even Better: Keeping the Environment Clean and
Responsible CorporateOfficers Out of Jail,55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1181, 1194 (1994).
32 Id.
33 Cf. Adler, supra note 22, at 798-99.
34 Id.

" United States Sentencing Commission, An Overview of the United States
Sentencing Commission, at 2, http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview.pdf
(last visited Sept. 22, 2005) (noting that "jj]udges are advised to choose a
sentence from within the guideline range unless the court identifies a factor that
the Sentencing Commission failed to consider that should result in a different
sentence"). The Sentencing Commission updated its overview materials
following the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct.
738 (2005), and now reflect that the guidelines are practically advisory.
36 Cf. Adler, supra note 22, at 797-99.
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jail time is critical to compliance and enforcement efforts.37
Without a meaningful threat of actual jail time to deter violations,
federal laws were in effect more form than substance.3" Under the
U.S.S.G., as enacted and interpreted until recently,3 9 a judge is
theoretically not permitted to depart from the sentence ranges
provided within the guidelines unless "there exists an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines [.]"4"
In the first four years under the U.S.S.G., the incidence of
using simple probation as a sentencing mechanism fell to half of the
pre-guideline levels.4 ' This, combined with the limitations placed on
parole, led to increased sentences and actual time served in prison
by offenders committing crimes covered by the U.S.S.G.42 Indeed,
under the U.S.S.G., criminals sentenced in federal court over the

3 Murnane, supra note 31, at 1184-85.
Criminal sanctions . . .are significantly more effective deterrents than civil penalties for two major reasons: (1) civil fines
can be passed on to the consumer... , while jail time cannot,
and (2) criminal penalties 'drive home the fact that noncompliance is often a crime rather than a business decision,'
and the stigma and adverse publicity . . . provide incentives
to comply.
Id. (footnote omitted).
38 Cf. Adler, supra note 22, at 797-99.
31 See infra Part I and notes 48-55, discussing a recent Supreme Court decision
holding that the U.S.S.G. implicate the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
when judges make findings of fact not submitted to a jury for the purpose of
applying a sentencing enhancement. In United States v. Booker and United States
v. Fanfan,125 S.Ct. 738, 757 (2005) (cases consolidated), the Supreme Court also
held that because of the Constitutional problems posed by the U.S.S.G. they would
be treated as advisory rather than mandatory going forward.
40 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000).
41 United States Sentencing Commission, Fifteen Years of GuidelinesSentencing:
An Assessment of How Well the FederalCriminalJusticeSystem Is Achieving the
Goals of Sentencing Reform, November 2004, at 43, http://www.ussc.gov/
15_year/chap2.pdf.
42

Id. at 43-45.
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last fifteen years received substantially more severe penalties than
defendants sentenced prior to the adoption of the guidelines.43
At the time the U.S.S.G. became effective, most of the
sentencing provisions relating specifically to environmental crimes
that apply today were included; however, several minor amendments to the guidelines have been made since that time." Specifically, the U.S. Sentencing Commission included seven guidelines4 5
relating to environmental crimes, five of which apply to offenses
under statutes within the EPA's jurisdiction.4 " Notably, the public
trust enhancement on which this Note focuses is not part of the
Id. at 46.
The specific sections of the U.S.S.G. in effect on November 1, 1987, that relate
to environmental offenses include §§ 2Q1.1-2Q1.4 and § 2Q2.1.
4' The existing criminal sanctions applicable to environmental crimes under
the
U.S.S.G. notably already include sentencing enhancements when certain fact
situations merit such application. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. Manual (2004) § 2Q1.2:
(1) §2Q1.2. Mishandling of Hazardous or Toxic Substances or
Pesticides; Recordkeeping, Tampering, and Falsification;
Unlawfully Transporting Hazardous Materials in Commerce
(a) Base Offense Level: 8
(b) Specific Offense Characteristics:
(1)(A) If the offense resulted in an ongoing, continuous, or
repetitive discharge, release, or emission of a hazardous or toxic
substance or pesticide into the environment, increase by 6
levels; or (B) If the offense otherwise involved a discharge,
release, or emission of a hazardous or toxic substance or
pesticide, increase by 4 levels.
(2) If the offense resulted in a substantial likelihood of death or
serious bodily injury, increase by 9 levels.
(3) If the offense resulted in disruption of public utilities or
evacuation of a community, or if a cleanup required a
substantial expenditure, increase by 4 levels.
(4) If the offense involved transportation, treatment, storage, or
disposal without a permit or in violation of a permit, increase by
4 levels.
(5) If a recordkeeping offense reflected an effort to conceal a
substantive environmental offense, use the offense level for the
substantive offense.
(6) If the offense involved a simple recordkeeping or reporting
violation only, decrease by 2 levels.
46 See Brunner, supra note 24, at 1339.
41
44
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seven guidelines that the U.S.S.G. labels as "offenses involving
the environment. 47
C.

Recent Developments Relating to the U.S.S.G. and the
Impact on the Future Use of Sentencing Enhancements

In January of 2005, the United States Supreme Court found
that the U.S.S.G. violate the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution in circumstances because as binding guidelines
they required judges to make factual decisions that impact prison
time.4" The Supreme Court ruled that when the application of a
sentencing enhancement contained within the U.S.S.G. requires a
judge to consider and rule upon facts not presented to the jury, or
stipulated to by the defendant, the Sixth Amendment is violated.49
The majority stated that "[i]f the guidelines ... could be read as
merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than
required, the selection of particular sentences in response to
differing sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth
Amendment."5 ° However, the Court interpreted the guidelines as
mandatory and binding on all judges in clear violation of the Sixth
Amendment. This holding required the Court to determine
whether or not the U.S.S.G. could be made advisory, which would
effectively salvage them and ensure that they can remain a
consideration during sentencing, at least for judges that wish to
consult the guidelines.5 1
In a bizarre twist, the Court effectively issued two separate
opinions in this case. In the first decision, Justice Stevens declared
that the U.S.S.G. are unconstitutional because they violate the

" See U.S.S.G. Manual (2004) §§ 2Q1.1-2Q1.6 & § 2Q2.1.
48 Hope Yen, Supreme Court Instructs Federal Courts to Review Hundreds of
Sentences, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 25, 2005, availableat http://www.law.
com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1106573712418.

United States v. Booker & United States v. Fanfan, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756 (2005)
(cases consolidated).
41

50 Id. at 750.
5' Id.

at 746.
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Sixth Amendment.52 Justice Breyer authored the second decision
in which the majority rejected the remedies suggested in the
briefing stage, in particular the suggestion that sentencing juries
be empaneled to hear additional evidence bearing on sentencing.53
In effect, the Court's decision authored by Justice Breyer makes
the guidelines advisory rather than mandatory by directing judges
to consult the guidelines for advice as to what sentences to apply.54
Judges now have greater discretion as to whether certain factors
should enhance or mitigate a sentence, but the opinion authored
by Justice Breyer specifically provides that too great an exercise of
discretion may be grounds for a reversal on appeal.55
The Supreme Court's recent ruling, with respect to the
U.S.S.G., raises a number of implications for federal sentencing in
general and sentencing under § 3B1.3 of the U.S.S.G in particular.
The Seventh Circuit decision in the Snook case applied this sentencing enhancement to an employee agent of a private regulated
utility. 56 One of the issues the Snook case raised is whether applying
§ 3B1.3 of the U.S.S.G. to the employee of a private entity is even
appropriate." This issue now stands against a backdrop of sentencing guidelines that are no longer binding on judges.
The fact that the guidelines are now advisory does not
detract from the underlying question of whether the public trust
enhancement in § 3B1.3 properly applies to' the employees or
agents of private regulated entities. 5' The fact that the guidelines
are no longer binding on judges may weigh upon the willingness of
some sentencing courts to extend the public trust enhancement,
and indeed other adjustments within the guidelines, more broadly
to new defendants and fact situations. Thus, the decision in Booker
52

Edward Lazarus, The Supreme Court's Sentencing Guidelines Decision: Its

Logic, and Its SurprisinglyLimited PracticalEffect, Jan. 21, 2005, http://www.
writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/2005012 1.html.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.;

see also Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 767.
United States v. Snook, 366 F.3d 439, 446 (7th Cir. 2004).
57 Id. at 445-46.
51 See infra Part III notes 109-64 and accompanying text.
56
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is an important development and consideration for Part IV of this
Note where arguments for and against extending the application
of the public trust enhancement are examined in greater detail.59
D.

The EPA's Views and Practices Concerning the Adjustment
of Sentences and PenaltiesBased on Conduct

Just as the U.S.S.G. encapsulates a regime of adjusting
sentences upward or downward based on a variety of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the EPA has adopted a philosophy of
mitigating civil and criminal penalties based upon the cooperation
of regulated entities.6 ° On July 9, 1986, the EPA promulgated its
"environmental auditing policy statement."'" The statement itself
followed months of comments submitted by interested parties.62
Many of the early comments expressed concern about the new
approach, including concerns from the regulated community that
the EPA might misuse information obtained from the self-reported
audit results. 63 Environmental activists were concerned that the
policy signaled that the EPA would reduce its investigation and
enforcement activities.' To the latter concern, the EPA responded
that it would neither forgo investigating sites belonging to entities
participating in the self-auditing programs nor reduce its enforcement responses.65
The initiative, which is still in effect, purports to "enhance
protection of human health and the environment by encouraging
regulated entities to voluntarily discover, promptly disclose, and

'9 See infra Part IV notes 165-221 and accompanying text.
60 6 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 17.03 (2005).
61 Id. at § 17.03[1].
62 Id. at § 17.03[2].
63 Id. at § 17.03[2].
64 Cf. id. § 17.03[2].
65 See id., supra note 60, at § 17.03[2]; see also Environmental Audit Policy
Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004, 25,007 (July 9, 1986) ("Indeed, a credible
enforcement program provides a strong incentive for regulated entities to audit.').
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expeditiously correct violations of Federal environmental requirements."66 Almost nine years after its adoption, the Audit Policy
continues to provide entities the opportunity to avoid severe
government sanctions by self-reporting and remediating violations. 7
The Audit Policy is hardly the only policy that the EPA in
particular, or the federal government more generally, adopted to
promote self-policing and reporting by private regulated entities.6 "
Flexible and cooperative approaches are largely creatures of
scholarly work taking place over the last thirty years and are thus
relatively new in comparison to the concept of traditional government regulation of private markets, which has existed for far
longer.69 Not only are more incentive-driven forms of regulatory
policy a relatively recent development, they are not universally
accepted as positive developments by commentators.7 °
One factor influencing the sustainability of self-policing and
reporting policies will be the extent to which such policies secure
reporting and remediation by regulated entities. With respect to
the Audit Policy, the EPA reports substantial progress in the
number of regulated entities self-reporting violations. 71 Nevertheless,
Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction, and Prevention
of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000), availableat http://www.epa.
gov/compliance/resources/policies/incentives/auditing/auditpolicy.pdf.
67 Ethan H. Jessup, Environmental Crimes and Corporate Liability: The
Evolution of the Prosecution of "Green" Crimes by CorporateEntities, 33 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 721, 727 (1999) (discussing the Department of Justice's policy of
"encourag[ing] self-auditing, self-policing and voluntary disclosure" in
consideration of when to prosecute for environmental crimes).
68 Cf. William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation,and the Trading
of Favors, 87 IowA L. REV. 643, 663 (2002).
69 See generally Robert R. Keuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of
Federal Environmental Laws, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2373 (1996) & Lucia Ann
Silecchia, Ounces of Prevention and Pounds of Cure: Developing Sound Policies
for Environmental CompliancePrograms,7 FORDHAM ENVTL. LAW J. 583 (1996)

(discussing the development of flexible regulatory approaches).
70 See generally Laufler, supra note 68 (for background discussion on the
desirability of tradeoffs between reduced enforcement costs and providing too
much freedom to regulated utilities).
7' The EPA points to the number of companies utilizing the policy and the
number of violations that some individual companies self-report as a suggestion
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egregious cases involving agents of regulated entities failing to
disclose or remedy violations72 persist. 3 This suggests that incentives that reward compliance and disclosure, such as those offered
through the Audit Policy, are insufficient to motivate some
regulated entities to comply with environmental requirements
of how successful the Audit Policy has become. EPA Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance, EPA Audit Policy Update, Mar. 1998, at 2,
http://www.es.epa.gov/ocea/apolguide.html. In 1997, GTE Corporation disclosed
and resolved 600 violations at more than 314 facilities. GTE paid $52,264 in
penalties for these violations while the EPA agreed to waive $2.38 million in
potential penalties based on GTE's good faith cooperation. Id. at 1. The EPA
extended the reach of the Audit Policy to additional sectors and now includes
above ground storage tanks, wetlands, nitrate compounds, grain producers,
airlines, telecommunications companies, and iron and steel mini-mills. EPA
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, EPA Audit Policy Update
Spring 2001, at 1, http://www.epa.gov/oeca/ore/auditupd.html. More than 1,150
companies disclosed violations covering more than 5,400 facilities in the first
four years of the Audit Policy. Id. at 1-2.
" Jeffrey Jackson and Michael Peters each received thirty-six months in prison
for concealing the discharge of benzene from an above-ground storage tank for
more than two years and providing false disclosures to the EPA. Press Release
#470, Department of Justice, Chemical Plant Managers Sentenced for Clean Air
Act Violations (Aug. 14, 2002), http:/www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/August/02enrd_470.htm; see also Press Release #679, Department of Justice, Second
Defendant Pleads Guilty in Case Charging S. Carolina Plant with Violations of
Clean Air Act (Nov. 15, 2002), http:/www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/November/02enrd_679.htm (explaining that an environmental supervisor pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to violate the Clean Water Act, and that Vice President of a chemical
plant was charged with sending false documents to public officials in order to
conceal illegal discharges of waste water containing processing chemicals into
the public sewer system).
73 See, e.g., Press Release #233, Department of Justice, Former Company Vice
President Convicted of Conspiring to Falsify Data on Millions of Gallons of
Reformulated Gasoline (Apr. 11, 2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/April/
03_enrd_233.htm & Press Release #691, Department of Justice, Major N.J. Iron
Pipe Manufacturer, Top Managers Charged in Eight-Year Conspiracy to Pollute,
Expose Employees to Danger, Cover Up and Impede Investigations (Dec. 15,
2003), http:/www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003fDecember/03_enrd_691.htm (explaining
that five management employees were charged for regularly discharging oil and
paint into the Delaware River over a period of eight years, exposing employees
to danger, concealing violations from investigators, and impeding investigations
by providing false data and information regarding emissions and compliance).

166

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.

[Vol. 30:153

or self-report violations of existing environmental regulations.74
It also suggests that existing criminal sanctions fail to induce
full compliance.
The EPA's policy has encouraged many entities to come
5
clean, but some entities continue to ignore their compliance
responsibilities and engage in violations of the nation's environmental rules.76 For these entities that refuse to meet compliance
obligations and fail to report violations, even under flexible
regulatory frameworks like the Audit Policy, alternative methods
to encourage their cooperation may prove necessary. Continued
efforts to increase the criminal penalties associated with environmental crimes is one method. After all, it has been noted, "[t]o the
businessman . . . prison is the inferno, and conventional risk-

reward analysis breaks down when the risk is jail."77
For the purpose of directing its enforcement efforts, the EPA
identifies specific types of illegal corporate activity it intends to
target.78 Among the factors the EPA identifies as important in
deciding whether to proceed with criminal prosecution are: (1) the
74

In 1998, the EPA surveyed regulated entities that had self-reported under the
policy. One of the questions on the survey asked the responding party whether
they would have disclosed without the policy. Of the fifty reported responses,
twenty-six claimed that they would not have disclosed or were unsure whether
they would have disclosed without the policy. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency Audit Policy User's Survey Results Part I, at 4, Question 9 (Dec. 22,
1998), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/incentives/auditing/auditpolicy.html. The
responses, though limited, suggest that regulated entities are voluntarily
discovering, disclosing, and remedying violations in greater numbers than before
the Audit Policy. Id.

" See supra note 71.
76
77

See supra notes 72-74.

Maura M. Okamoto, RCRA's Criminal Sanctions:A Deterrent Strong Enough
to Compel Compliance?, 19 HAWAII L. REV. 425 (1997) (quotingArthur L. Liman,
The Paper Label Sentences: Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 619, 630-31 (1977)).
78 See Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, Office of Criminal Enforcement to
All EPA Employees Working in or in Support of the Criminal Enforcement
Program (Jan. 12, 1994), at 3-6, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/
policies/criminal/exercise.pdf (noting that the EPA will be guided by two general
criteria in selecting cases for criminal prosecution, significant environmental
harm and culpable conduct).
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gravity and extent of any health or environmental impact of the
conduct, (2) the timeliness and degree of disclosure made to relevant regulatory authorities, (3) the timeliness and degree of efforts
made to control the problem or mitigate the effects, (4) history of
recurrent or persistent violations, and (5) evidence of intentional
noncompliance."9 These factors, along with the willingness of the
EPA to consider the efforts of regulated corporate entities to report
and remediate problems, provide further evidence that the agency
embraces a cooperative and more flexible regulatory approach.
A major consideration for the future of flexible regulatory
regimes is the extent to which abuse of more flexible forms of
regulation can be curtailed. 0 Policymakers, legislative and administrative alike, will have limited confidence in less rigid regulatory
frameworks if such abuses take place. Therefore, finding a way to
enhance criminal sanctions, the "bigger stick" to accompany the
"carrots" provided through approaches like the Audit Policy,
becomes a more important consideration. 1
Part II of this Note, which follows, introduces the public
trust enhancement in greater detail, including its historical
application. If federal courts adopt a philosophy with respect to the
public trust enhancement that is more in line with the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Snook, an additional criminal penalty may be
available to satisfy commentators, like Okamoto, that desire
additional criminal sanctions as a means of achieving greater
compliance.
II.

HISTORICAL APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST ENHANCEMENT AT § 3B1.3 OF THE U.S.S.G.

Part I included discussion of the evolution of the U.S.S.G. as
a sentencing mechanism and the important and timely role the
guidelines played in securing actual jail time for defendants

79
80

See supra note 77 at 442.
See infra Part IV.

"' See infra Part IV notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
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committing environmental crimes.8 2 That discussion focused
largely on the "Offenses Involving the Environment" appearing at
U.S.S.G. §§ 2Q1.1-2Q1.6 and § 2Q2.1. The public trust enhancement became effective at the same time that these sections were
adopted, but, until very recently, courts did not apply this enhancement in the context of environmental crimes by the employees and
agents of private regulated entities.8 3
The U.S.S.G.'s Commentary and Application Notes make
clear that to be considered a position of public or private trust, the
position must involve "professional or managerial discretion" and
generally be subject to less supervision than other employees."4 For
the public trust enhancement itself to apply, the agent or employee's position must "have contributed in some significant way
to facilitating the commission or concealment" of the crime. s5
According to the Commentary provided with § 3B1.3, examples
include an attorney embezzling a client's funds, a bank executive's
fraudulent loan scheme, or abuse of a patient by a doctor, but
would not include the same offenses by a bank teller or hotel clerk
because such positions involve more limited discretion. 6
Until recently, the majority of court cases involving the
application of the public trust enhancement followed the expected
path based on the Application Notes at § 3B1.3. s7 Federal courts
found bank presidents 8 and managers, 9 credit card authorization

82

See supra Part I notes 31-38 and 41-55 and accompanying text.

s U.S.S.G. Manual (2003) § 3B1.3 Application Notes 1-4; see also infra Part II
and notes 84-97 and 100-64 (describing the historical application of the public
trust enhancement).
84 U.S.S.G. Manual (2003) § 3B1.3, supra note 81, at Application Note 1.
85

Id.

86Id.
87

Jondavid S. DeLong, Annotation, Increase in Base Offense Level Under

Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.3 (18 U.S.C.S. § 3B1.3) For Abuse of Position of
Public or Private Trust Significantly FacilitatingCommission or Concealment
of Offense, 121 A.L.R. FED. 323 (1994).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Buchanan, 987 F. Supp. 56 (D. Mass. 1997).
89 See, e.g., United States v. McMillen, 917 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1990).
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agents, 90 accountants, 9' teachers,9 2 and even customer service

representatives 93 to hold positions of public trust. At the same
time, courts refused to apply the public trust enhancement to
ordinary bank or hotel clerks, 94 casual mail handlers 95 and other
similar positions. In differentiating between types of positions and
functions that create a public or private trust, the courts traditionally considered a number of factors including (1) the defendant's
freedom to commit an easily concealed wrong, (2) whether an
abuse of the position can be readily detected, (3) duties of the
position relative to other employees, (4) level of specialized
knowledge required for the job, (5) the position's authority, and (6)
the level of trust placed in the position by the public. 96
Of particular concern to the courts applying the public or
private trust component of the public trust enhancement are (a)
whether the victim of the crime was particularly vulnerable, (b)
whether the crime disrupts a governmental function, and (c) the
level of discretion that the individual defendant has in the position
relative to other employees. 97 Generally, (1) the more discretion the
position has, particularly as it relates to the ability to use the
position as a means to conceal the crime, (2) the more vulnerable
the victim, and (3) the more disruptive the criminal action is to
governmental functions, the more likely a court has been to find
that the position is one of public or private trust.98 These factors
and considerations are discussed in Part III as they relate to the
cases involving the employees and agents of regulated entities that
provide the source of the current split in the federal Circuit Courts
of Appeal.99
0 See, e.g., Gibbs v. United States, 17 F.3d 1425 (2d Cir. 1994).
See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 231 F.3d 1087 (7th Cir. 2000).
92 See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 15 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 1994).
93 See, e.g., United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
91

528 U.S. 945 (1999).

94 See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 201 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2000).
95 See, e.g., United States v. Arrington, 765 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
96

DeLong, supra note 87, at 346.

97 Id. at 344-46.

See supra notes 87-95.
99 See infra Part III notes 109-64 and accompanying text.
98
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For the special skill component of § 3B1.3 of the U.S.S.G. to
apply, the individual must possess a skill not shared by the public,
one which generally involves substantial education, training, or
licensing. 10 Examples provided within the commentary following
§ 3B1.3 include pilots, lawyers, doctors, accountants, chemists, and
demolition experts.'' Nothing in the U.S.S.G. specifically applies
the public trust or special skill standards to employees or agents
of private regulated entities, although we could conclude that such
individuals, trained and skilled in monitoring and reporting,
reasonably fit within the outlined categories.
In applying the special skill component of the public trust
enhancement found at U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, the federal courts look at
(1) whether the skill allegedly used to commit the offense truly
meets the meaning of § 3B1.3, (2) whether the special skill used
significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the
crime, and (3) whether the base offense level provided by the
U.S.S.G. adequately takes into account the skill and characteristics of both the offense and the offender. 102 Based on these criteria,
accountants, 0 3 appraisers and adjusters, 104 bomb makers, 10 5 and
chemists, 10 6 among others, have all been found to possess a special
skill meriting the application of the special skill component of the
public trust enhancement. As with the public or private trust
component of the public trust enhancement, the application of the
enhancement appears to depend not only on whether a trust or
special skill is found, but also on the role that the trust or skill
played in the commission of the offense. The more significant the
role the special skill plays in the commission or concealment of the

'00 U.S.S.G. Manual (2003), supra note 83, at Application Note 3.
101 Id.
102

Timothy M. Hall, Annotation, Propriety of Increase of Offense Level Under

Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.3 for Use of "Special Skill" in Commission or
Concealment of Offense, 122 A.L.R. FED. 281 (1994).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Noah, 130 F.3d 490 (1st Cir. 1997).
104 See, e.g., United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1990).
105 See, e.g., United States v. Talbott, 902 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1990).
106 See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 61 F.3d 976 (1st Cir. 1995).
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offense, the more likely it is that a defendant will receive an
upward adjustment to his or her sentence under § 3B1.3. l1 v
A central element of the foregoing discussion is that the
federal courts developed a framework and standard for the
evaluation and application of the public trust enhancement over
the last seventeen years. This framework and body of case law
allow the courts to objectively evaluate the applicability of the
public trust enhancement to any particular criminal defendant.
This is a critical consideration in evaluating criticisms and
concerns about the ability of the courts to apply the public trust
enhancement to the agents of entities regulated under federal
environmental laws. An additional point of emphasis is that many
of the defendants receiving the public trust enhancement to date
are agents of private employers, a point that cuts directly against
the arguments of critics suggesting that application of the public
trust enhancement to all agents of a private employer goes beyond
the purpose or intent of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 as enacted.'
III.

THE STATE OF THE CIRCUITS ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
PUBLIC TRUST ENHANCEMENT TO THE EMPLOYEES AND
AGENTS OF PRIVATE REGULATED ENTITIES
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES

The foregoing discussion makes plain that until very
recently, courts applied the public trust enhancement primarily to
non-environmental crimes. "09 Specifically, courts applied the public
trust enhancement to crimes involving finance; the physical abuse,
neglect, or exploitation of a patient, client, or child with whom the
offender had a relationship of trust, custody, or care; and other
instances in which a victim was particularly vulnerable."' Courts
See supranotes 102-06.
See infra Part IV notes 167-221 and accompanying text (discussing the
arguments against extending the application of the public trust enhancement).
109 See supra Part II notes 83-97 and 100-06 and accompanying text.
107
1o8

110 See id.
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have also applied the public trust enhancement to public officials
and officers of private entities working on government contracts."'
It is hardly surprising that the federal courts have struggled with
how to apply § 3B1.3 of the U.S.S.G. to a set of criminal offenses
that go beyond traditional areas where the enhancement has been
applied. 112 After all, there is a limited supply of case law applying
the public trust enhancement to environmental crimes and the
public trust enhancement is not conveniently located among the
13
sentencing enhancements for crimes against the environment.
One of the great stumbling blocks to a broader application
of the public trust enhancement to the employees and agents of
private regulated entities is that these agents are neither public
officials or private agents working on government contracts, nor
are they typically in custodial or care giver positions where victims
might be particularly vulnerable." 4 This fact places such agents
outside the reach of many, if not most, of the prior federal court
decisions applying the public trust enhancement.115 Arguing that
an employee or agent of a regulated entity occupies a position in
which the public has vested trust, regardless of how much
discretion an employee has in his or her position is quite difficult.
Therefore, extending the application of the public trust enhancement in this manner does not logically follow from the string of
1 6
cases applying § 3B1.3 of the U.S.S.G. in the 1990s. 1

"1

112

DeLong, supra note 87, at 350-61.
Snook, 366 F.3d at 450 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (noting that "no other circuit

court... has extended the public trust enhancement to private individuals who
work in industries that are regulated to protect the public health").
"' U.S.S.G. Manual (2003) § 3B1.3 & Application Notes.
114 See supra notes 87-97 and 102-06 and accompanying text
(discussing the
traditional application of the public trust enhancement to certain individuals
and types of relationships).
"1 Id. (noting the limited application of the public trust enhancement to private
agents and employees by the federal courts).
116 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 125 F.3d 401 (7th Cir. 1997); United
States
v. Strang, 80 F.3d 1214 (7th Cir. 1996); and United States v. Isaacson, 155 F.3d
1083 (9th Cir. 1998).
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The Seventh Circuit

In April of 2004, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit decided in United States v. Snook, 117 that the defendant
Ronald Snook could be held responsible for an abuse of the public
trust even though he worked as an environmental manager for a
private Illinois petroleum refinery."' As the Environmental
Reporting Manager, Snook was responsible for reporting water
quality results for the refinery's discharges. "9 Snook's reports from
1994 to 1997 showed that the refinery met all of the applicable
water quality standards. 2 0 However, the actual tests conducted by
the refinery showed that the refinery had not complied with all of
the standards.' 2 ' In effect, the defendant deliberately misreported
the refinery water quality results for a period of almost four years.
The District Court found Snook guilty of violating the public trust
and imposed a two-level increase in his sentence
under § 3B1.3 of
22
enhancement.
trust
public
the
U.S.S.G.,
the
Snook appealed his twenty-one-month sentence to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals arguing that the district court
erred in applying the public trust enhancement.'23 The Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's imposition of the sentencing
enhancement, reasoning that because the Clean Water Act' 24 is
public-welfare legislation,'2 5 and the defendant occupied a position
117

366 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 2004).

118

Snook, 366 F.3d at 447.
at 442-43.

119 Id.
12 0

121

Id. at 442.
Ronald Snook worked as the Environmental Manager at Clark Refining &

Marketing, Inc., a petroleum refinery in Illinois. Each day, Clark discharged up
to one million gallons of waste water into the Water Reclamation District of
Greater Chicago. Id. The District required self-monitoring and reporting to
ensure compliance with sewage and waste control ordinances. Snook was
convicted of conspiring with Elva Causiello, an Assistant Manager, to selectively
report testing results and to exclude from their reports any violations. Id.
122

Snook, 366 F.3d at 446.

123

Id.

124

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.S. § 1251 (LexisNexis 2005).
The Snook majority refers to public welfare legislation in passing and

125
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with responsibility and discretion, the self-reporting violations
directly affect the public health and safety.'26 Thus, according to
district court appropriately applied the
the Court of Appeals, the 127
enhancement.
sentencing
The Ninth Circuit

B.

In 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took a different
position in a case quite similar to Snook. In United States v.
Technic Services, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that Rick Rushing,
a manager at Technic Services, Inc. ("TSI"), did not violate a
position of trust when he solicited employees to lie and to sign false
statements claiming TSI never dumped its waste water into
navigable waters."' As a result, Rushing was not subjected to the
public trust enhancement available under the U.S.S.G.'29
In 1995, TSI successfully bid on an asbestos removal project
at a pulp mill in Alaska. 3 ° A year later, the EPA stopped the
project because of noncompliance with asbestos removal and
disposal standards. 3 ' The pulp mill then hired a third-party
monitor to ensure TSI's compliance with the applicable standards.' 32 In early 1997, the third-party certified that the building

discusses the term in the context of legislative or administrative rules that
create an expectation by the public that entities subject to the rules will comply
and that this compliance in effect enhances public health and safety. Snook, 366
F.3d at 447.
126 The court reasoned that Snook's victims were the Water and Sewage District
and the public at large. Further, the court held that even though the District
periodically conducted its own testing, it relied to a large extent on the
self-reporting mechanism. Because of his unique position and knowledge, and
the direct affect of his violations on the public, Snook occupied a position of trust,
which he abused. Id. at 446.
127 Id.

...
United States v. Technic Servs., Inc., 314 F.3d 1031, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 2002).
129 Id. at 1048.
130 Id. at 1036.
131 Id.
132

Id. at 1037.
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was clean.' 33 Throughout the investigation of the removal project,
TSI maintained that it was not washing waste water (and
asbestos) into drains that flowed into a nearby bay.'34 The company
even included a statement to this effect in its correspondence with
the EPA.'35 Then, in late 1998 the EPA asked the third-party
monitor to take one last look at the mill before it was demolished.'36 That investigation produced evidence that TSI had
continued to wash wastewater into the drains and had lied to
investigators.' 37 The criminal prosecution followed.
The decision in Technic Services reaffirms past decisions of
the Ninth Circuit, which provide that when the government or the
public are the victims, the defendant holds a position of public
trust only when the defendant is a government employee or
exercises directly delegated public authority. 3 ' Strictly construing
the foregoing standard, the Ninth Circuit held that Rushing's
duties did not create a position of public trust and he could not
therefore violate a public trust.3 9 It is worth noting that a
defendant can theoretically fall under the public trust enhancement by violating a private trust as well.140 The Court sidestepped
this issue, however, by suggesting the record below was not
complete enough to allow such a finding.''
Under the Ninth Circuit construction, the employee or agent
of a private entity not working on a government contract likely
falls outside the public trust requirement necessary to apply the
public trust enhancement.' 42 This directly conflicts with the
position taken by the Seventh Circuit, and even conflicts, as the

133 Id.
134

Technic Servs., 314 F.3d at 1038.

Id.
136 Id.
135

137
138

Id.

Id. at 1051.

139 Id.

U.S.S.G. Manual (2003) § 3B1.3 & Application Notes.
Technic Servs., 314 F.3d at 1054.
142 Id.
140
141
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Ninth Circuit concedes, with the position taken by the First Circuit
143
in United States v. Gonzalez-Alvarez.
C.

Other Circuits

The First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits address the application
of the public trust enhancement to environmental crimes to varying,
though less decisive, degrees than either the Ninth or Seventh
Circuits. This result creates a confusing array of disparate holdings.
1.

The First Circuit

In United States v. Gonzalez-Alvarez, the First Circuit Court
of Appeals held that a licensed dairy farmer could violate the
public trust.1 4 The defendant, Victor Gonzalez-Alvarez, acted in
concert with other employees and drivers to knowingly transport
and insert contaminated milk into commerce. 45 The district court
did not apply the public trust enhancement; but on appeal, the
Court of Appeals found that the public had an expectation that
milk producers would comply with safety regulations and that this
47
expectation imposed 146 upon the defendant a duty or public trust.1
The Court of Appeals also stated that the nature of the
defendant's actions violated that trust and merited the application
of the public trust enhancement. 14' The First Circuit clearly
believes that some circumstances (such as protecting public health)
place a special trust or duty upon the agent of a private entity,
which merits the application of the public trust sentencing
enhancement when that trust is violated. In this respect, the First
143 Id. at

1051.

144

United States v. Gonzalez-Alvarez, 277 F.3d 73, 82 (1st Cir. 2002).

145

Id. at 76.
Id. at 81.

146

Notably, the view that rules or regulations can create a public expectation of
compliance, which in turn gives rise to a public trust, is quite similar to the
public welfare standard articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Snook. See supra
notes 121-22.
148 See supra note 141.
147
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Circuit occupies the same end of the spectrum as the Seventh
Circuit, though the Seventh Circuit's holding implies that public
health and safety legislation may be essential before a public trust
is created. The First Circuit's holding does not limit the creation of
a public trust to instances where public welfare legislation is
involved, but it fails to provide enough of a framework to determine just how far the Circuit is willing to go in imposing a trust on
a private entity or its agents.
2.

The Sixth Circuit

The Sixth Circuit confronted the application of the public
trust enhancement to environmental crimes in United States v.
White.'49 John White and Carolyn Taylor were convicted of making
false statements regarding a matter within the jurisdiction of the
federal government. 5 ' Specifically, White and Taylor submitted
reports to the Kentucky Division of Water that contained falsified
turbidity measurements. 5 ' The government and the defendants
appealed the district court's decision on a variety of grounds
including the application of sentencing enhancements.' 52 Two of
the most important issues on appeal concerned whether White held
a position of public or private trust that facilitated the commission
of the crime and whether the general public can be considered a
victim for purposes of the analysis.'5 3
Ultimately, the court established that even though White's
immediate responsibilities were to the EPA and the Division of
Water, the general public suffered as a result of his criminal
activity.'54 In analyzing whether the district court should have
149

270 F.3d 356, 370 (6th Cir. 2001).

150 Id. at 360.
151

Turbidity refers to the amount of suspended particulate matter in post

treatment water. Turbidity data is one of several types of data collected and
provided to the Kentucky Division of Water as part of the Division's enforcement
of the federal Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-18 (1994). Id.
152

153
154

Id.
White, 270 F.3d at 371.
Id.
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applied the public trust enhancement to White, the Court of
Appeals rejected two extremes: one that would subject any
government bureaucrat guilty of any crime to the enhancement,
and the other that only elected officials enjoy the level of public
trust necessary to apply the enhancement.155 The Court of Appeals
embraced what it called the "apparent reasoning of our sister
circuits" under which officers with responsibility for protecting
public health and safety enjoy a special trust with the public which
is breached when they commit a crime.15
The Sixth Circuit's reasoning applies in the context of a
government employee and not necessarily to the agent of a private
entity. However, the notion that individuals with responsibility for
protecting public health and safety enjoy a public trust is compatible with the Seventh Circuit's holding in Snook, which held that
the defendant's compliance position, coupled with the public
welfare legislation he violated, made applying the public trust
enhancement appropriate. 7
3.

The Fourth Circuit

In United States v. Ellen,15 1 the Court of Appeals held that
the district court did not commit error when it refused to apply the
"special skill" component of the public trust enhancement to a
private contractor charged with knowingly filling in wetlands
without a permit, a violation of the Clean Water Act.159
The court rejected arguments by the federal government
that by failing to apply the public trust or use of special skill
component of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, the district court created an
exemption that excuses defendants who commit regulatory crimes
in the course of their profession from enhanced penalties because

155 Id. at 372.
156

Id. at 373.

157

Snook, 366 F.3d at 446.

158

961 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1992).

Specifically, the defendant, William Ellen, was charged with violating 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and 1319(c)(2)(A). Ellen, 961 F.2d at 464.
159
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of the use of a special skill. 6 ° The Court of Appeals did not address
whether the district court should have applied the public trust or
use of special skill enhancement, but did find that it was within
the district court's discretion to decline application of the enhancement. 161 By extension, the district court could have applied the
enhancement, though it did not. To know for certain, the Fourth
Circuit must confront the actual application of the public trust or
use of special skill enhancement to the agent of a private entity.
The range of holdings in the foregoing decisions raise the
question of exactly when and to whom the public trust or use of
special skill enhancement attaches when applying criminal
sanctions to environmental crimes, and, in particular, to the
employees and agents of private regulated entities. Prior to these
decisions, the assumption was that the agents of a private entity
were beyond the reach of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. Now, all that is certain
is that the standard appears to lie somewhere between (1) total
preclusion of the public trust enhancement's use against nongovernmental employees or private actors working on government
contracts (the Ninth Circuit position), 162 and (2) application against
any agent or employee (public or private) that commits an
environmental crime in violation of a public or private trust or
though the use of a special skill (the Seventh Circuit position). In
several Circuits, notably the Fourth and Seventh, application of
the public trust or use of special skill enhancement requires that
the criminal offense threaten public safety or health.'63
Whether the standard is a more objective one involving
public safety and health legislation, or a more subjective one
involving judgments about what the general public expects of
agents whose crimes might threaten public safety or health
remains to be seen. This is just one of the many questions that
remain in the wake of Snook and the Supreme Court's decision to
make the U.S.S.G. merely advisory.'
160

Id. at 469.

161 Id.
162
163
164

Technic Servs., 314 F.3d at 1051.
See Ellen, 961 F.2d at 464 and Snook, 366 F.3d at 446.
See supra Part I.
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SHOULD THE PUBLIC TRUST ENHANCEMENT'S APPLICATION

BE EXPANDED TO ALLOW ITS USE TO ENCOURAGE BETTER
COMPLIANCE?

With the evolution of sentencing adjustments in criminal
prosecutions and the replacement of the old "command and control"'65 regulatory frameworks with a system of incentives and
penalties to encourage compliance, allowing federal courts to apply
the public trust enhancement more broadly would be consistent
with the general direction of change toward incentive and penaltybased enforcement.
The availability of the public trust enhancement as a criminal
sentencing factor would undoubtedly affect the EPA's enforcement
and prosecution strategy and the cost-benefit analysis of would-be
offenders. Before discussing whether some action by the Supreme
Court or the U.S. Sentencing Commission is necessary to remedy
the Circuit split, it is important to consider a number of policy
implications connected to the public trust enhancement that commentators have identified since the U.S. Sentencing Commission
adopted the U.S.S.G.' 66
A.

FavoringExpansion of the Public Trust Enhancement

A number of arguments exist suggesting that expanding the
application of the public trust enhancement in the manner envisioned by the Seventh Circuit's decision in Snook would be an
appropriate and necessary step in the evolution of environmental
Teresa Zhang, The Place of the Command and Control Paradigm in US
Environmental Policy, VISION, Nov. 17, 2003, http://www.wscsd.org/ejournal/
article.php3?id-article=60. Zhang notes that "[tihe bulk of environmental regulations in the US are characterized as 'Command and Control'. In this approach,
regulators set limits to emissions from various sources by requiring the best
available technology (BAT)." She also notes that "[t]he command and control
paradigm was and continues to be so effective because, as its name implies, the
regulations are tough. The government told firms across industries and across
America were told what to do, when to do it and how to do it."
166 The Sentencing Act of 1984 created the United States Sentencing
Commission, which, in turn, created the U.S.S.G. in 1987. Supra note 1.
165
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crime prosecution. The first argument concerns the need to increase
penalties as a means of producing more widespread compliance and
a level competitive playing field within industries.167 Even the EPA
recognizes that compliance with environmental regulations is costly
and requires a commitment of time and resources on the part of a
regulated entity, a commitment that leaves the corporation disadvantaged relative to competitors that do not invest in compliance
efforts. 6 ' As noted in Part I, in spite of the Audit Policy, and other
policies and programs under which the EPA waives or reduces
penalties for self-reporting and remediation, a number of entities
continue to ignore their compliance responsibilities.'6 9 Proponents
of preserving flexible regulatory regimes generally note that more
severe criminal sanctions may be the best means to curtail this
persistent noncompliance and to achieve a balanced playing
field. 170
A second argument in favor of expanding the application of
the public trust enhancement is that the success of self-auditing
and reporting programs depends upon cooperation from the
regulated entities. Agencies employing flexible regulatory regimes,
and the general public, rely upon the honesty of the personnel
involved in monitoring and reporting. When those parties fail to
meet their compliance responsibilities, or where they act in a
willfully dishonest manner, the confidence in alternative regulation methods is undermined.' 7 ' The reliance on cooperation and
honesty gives rise to the suggestion that increased criminal penalties may be required, particularly when the violations involve

167 Environmental

Protection Agency Audit Policy Statement, Incentives for SelfPolicing:Discovery,Disclosure,Correction,and Preventionof Violations,65 Fed.
Reg. 19,618, 19,620 (Apr. 11, 2000) ("[c]ollecting economic benefit is fair because
it protects law-abiding companies from being undercut by their noncomplying
competitors,
thereby preserving a level playing field").
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See supra Part I notes 72-73.
Cf. Murnane, supranote 37; see generally Okamoto, supra note 77.
Cf. supra Part I notes 70 and 71 (providing examples of how the high
visibility and extreme nature of willful violations precipitates public reaction
and media attention).
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willful misrepresentation or concealment as in both Snook and
Technic Services.
Maura Okamoto writes that "[j]ail for the.., defendant is
the only real deterrent. It carries a social obloquy that brands the
offender for what he is."'72 In her experience "one jail sentence was
worth 100 consent decrees and.., fines are meaningless because
the defendant in the end is always reimbursed by the proceeds of
' For commenhis wrongdoing or by the company down the line."173
tators like Okamoto, "[c]ompliance with environmental regulations
. .will only be successful if matched with a strong deterrent to
compel compliance."' 74
Unfortunately for individuals that hold to the belief that
criminal penalties provide incentive to comply with regulatory
requirements, recent history provides reason to be skeptical. The
federal government's efforts to enforce the nation's environmental
rules have ramped up steadily for more than a decade.' 75 The
ramp-up in enforcement, by means of criminal prosecution, has
been continuous and has involved amendments to strengthen
existing environmental statutes'7 6 and the assignment of sentencing enhancements under §§ 2Q1.1-2Q1.6 and § 2Q2.1 of the
U.S.S.G. 7' In spite of the increases in prosecutions and sentences,
and the availability of incentives under the Audit Policy and other
programs, violations continue.'78
At the same time, there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of entities self-reporting and remediating violations under
*
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Okamoto, supra note 77, at 428.

173

Id.

174

Id.

175

See Kevin A. Gaynor & Thomas R. Bartman, Criminal Enforcement of

Environmental Laws, 10 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 39 (1999).
176 For example, in 1987 Congress amended the Clean Water Act to increase
prison sentences from one to three years for violations, and in 1990 amended the
Clean Air Act to upgrade penalties for existing violations and to convert
penalties for other violations from misdemeanors to felonies. Id. at 40.
177 Id. at 41.
171 See supra notes 72-73.
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the Audit Policy.' 79 The increased cooperation and reporting in the
late 1990s under the Audit Policy occurred without significant
increases in criminal sanctions, which occurred primarily in the
late 1980s and early 1990s.18 0 That criminal violations continued
during times when significant increases to criminal penalties were
being enacted, and major cooperation and self-reporting has
occurred under the Audit Policy, calls into question just how strong
the link between increased criminal penalties and regulatory
compliance really is. The public trust enhancement would increase
a sentencing level by only a small amount under the U.S.S.G. even
where a sentencing court decides it is applicable.'
Given the
tenuous nature of the link between increased penalties and
improved compliance, and the limited increase in sentencing levels
the public trust enhancement would provide, additional criminal
sanctions as a deterrent, standing alone, is not a persuasive reason
to expand the application of the enhancement.
B.

Against Expanding the Public Trust Enhancement

Just as there are arguments that tend to favor the extension
of the public trust enhancement beyond the limits of its historical
application, a number of arguments suggest that expanding the
enhancement would not be wise. These include the belief that the
application of the guidelines, particularly those relating to
18 2
environmental crimes, has been arbitrary and inconsistent.
Arguments against expanding the application of the public trust
enhancement also include concerns about the obliteration of the
traditional distinction between units of government and private
employers,8 3 the potential for the enhancement to create "double

See supranote 71.
Gaynor & Bartman, supranote 175, at 39-47.
"1 See supra note 4.
12 Jane Barrett, Sentencing Environmental Crimes Under the United States
179
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Sentencing Guidelines-A Sentencing Lottery, 22 ENVTL. L. 1421, 1426-49 (1992).
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Snook, 366 F.3d at 450.
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counting" or multiple sanctions for the same offense,'
and
extraordinarily high sentences imposed on mid and low-level
employees that are in effect "scapegoats" for higher level managers
and officers."8 5
The guidelines relating to environmental offenses reside in
Part Q of the U.S.S.G.8 6 The first category of offenses is broken
down into six distinct subcategories" 7 while the second part deals
primarily with conservation and wildlife offenses.' 8 As with other
sections of the guidelines, the U.S. Sentencing Commission chose
a base offense level that reflects the severity of the least egregious
offenses within the category." 9 From these base level offenses,
adjustments upward or downward apply based on the individual
conduct of offenders and the overall factual circumstances. 9 ' While
the scheme appears at first blush to be an objective formula to
achieve the Sentencing Reform Act's' 9 ' goal of consistency and
proportionality of sentences, critics are quick to point to the
manner in which built in flexibility undercuts these goals and
produces a wide range of sentences for very similar offenses.' 92
This inconsistency in sentencing results largely from the upward
and downward adjustments available in the guidelines and the
flexibility given to sentencing courts in the application notes that
follow Part Q.' 93
Commentator Jane Barrett examined the application of the
Part Q environmental guidelines in a number of cases and found
that the sentences received by individual defendants varied

184 Jacqueline E. Ross, Damned UnderMany Headings:The Problem of Multiple
Punishment, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 245, 268 (2002).
185 See Laufer, supra note 66, at 658-68.
86
U.S.S.G.Manual (2003) §§ 2Q1.1-2Q1.6 & § 2Q2.1 (covering offenses involve

the environment).
87
1 Id.
188

See Barrett, supra note 182, at 1426.

189

Id. at 1427.

190

See supra note 2.
See supra note 1.
See Barrett, supra note 182, at 1427.

191
192
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Id. at 1428.
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greatly, even for similar offenses, based on which court constructed
the defendant's sentence from the guidelines.' One point that
Barrett's analysis brings to the forefront is that sentencing under
the guidelines can be unpredictable and uneven. Some might even
consider sentencing to be arbitrary. Making additional adjustments, such as the public trust enhancement, applicable to a
greater range of defendants would only exacerbate inconsistency
and arbitrary application by sentencing courts.
Barrett's analysis was completed in a time frame when the
U.S.S.G. were considered binding on courts. 9 5 Now that the
guidelines are only advisory, undoubtedly some sentencing courts
will choose to consult them while others will not. Even among
courts that continue to consult the guidelines there will be great
variation in the sentences that are cobbled together from the
available base offense levels and adjustments. This range of
sentencing applications is precisely what many of the critics point
to as a failing of the guidelines in general. 9 '
The concerns of Professor Barrett and other critics of
inconsistent and varied sentences under Part Q, and the guidelines
more broadly, are quite reasonable. The underlying concern,
however, is with the potential for too much disparity and variation
in sentencing due to the very structure of the guidelines and their
application notes. The remedy for this disparity and variance is to
continue amending the guidelines in order to eliminate some of
the sentencing departures.'97 Simply limiting the application of
sentencing adjustments on a guideline by guideline basis would do
nothing to alleviate generalized sentencing disparity under the

194

195

Id. at 1429-37.

Barrett's article appeared in 1992. The Supreme Court held in January of

2005 that the U.S.S.G. are advisory and not binding. See supraPart I, notes 4552.
196
See, e.g., Kevin A. Gaynor, A System Spinning Out of Control, 7 ENVTL. F. 28
(1990); Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules:
Findingand Using the Philosophy of the FederalSentencing Guidelines,40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 19 (2003) (arguing that the U.S. Sentencing Commission failed to
articulate a consistent sentencing philosophy for judges).
197 See infra note 233.
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guidelines. The public trust enhancement itself has been applied
to a range of offenses 9 ' and defendants for at least seventeen years
and will continue to apply to a range of offenses whether the public
trust enhancement's application is broadened or not. Thus, concern
about inconsistent and varied sentences is not an independent
basis to believe that the enhancement should not apply to defendants like Ronald Snook.
A second criticism of extending the public trust enhancement to private individuals working in regulated industries
concerns the traditional distinction between public and private
entities within the U.S.S.G. 199 The objection centers around the
notion that the public trust enhancement, particularly as applied
historically, requires that the victim actually entrust the offender
with discretion and judgment.2 °° The dissent in Snook and the
majority in Technic Services both argue strongly that a defendant
must be in a position of trust vis-a-vis the public or federal
government for that trust to occur. 20 ' Both also argue that
government employment, capacity as an elected or appointed
public official, or work on government contracts are the means
through which the requisite quasi-fiduciary relationship to the
public becomes established.2 2
The majority opinion in Technic Services articulated its
concern with extending the public trust enhancement rather
succinctly. The opinion stated that "the public expects that people
...will comply with health and safety regulations for which they
are responsible," but noted that this simple expectation does not
create a public trust in every individual involved in a position that
may impact upon the public health and safety. 2 3 Allowing the
decision to expand the application of the public trust enhancement
to be driven by the fact that the public expects everyone to comply

See supra Part II.
Snook, 366 F.3d at 451 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
200
Id. at 448.
201 Id. at 444; see also Technic Servs., 314 F.3d at 1049-50.
'9'
199

202

Id.

203

Id. at 1050.
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with health and safety regulations would create "no meaningful
screen with which to filter out enhancement-eligible defendants.
The abuse-of-trust enhancement would become applicable to
nearly any defendant."2 °4
This last point echos the concerns expressed in the Snook
dissent that such an expansive application of the public trust
enhancement would lead to absurd results, including for example,
a situation where every executive certifying a tax return could face
a public trust enhancement penalty if that return is later found to
be false.2 °5 The Snook majority tried to steer a course around this
problem by limiting the application of the public trust enhancement to crimes impacting public health, but as the dissent points
out, there is simply no basis in the U.S.S.G. to make such a
distinction.20 6 The lack of such a directive or application note in
the U.S.S.G. means that sentencing courts would not be limited to
criminal acts implicating public health and could enhance the
sentences of any defendant holding a position of authority or
supervision.
The fact that the guidelines are now advisory does little to
alleviate concern that some sentencing courts may expand the new
public trust enhancement adjustment application standard to
absurd levels. However, in the recent Booker decision, the Supreme
Court made clear that unreasonable applications of the U.S.S.G.
criteria would be subject to reversal on appeal.20 7 The preservation
of review for sentencing under the U.S.S.G. is an important
consideration in deciding whether or not to expand the application
of sentencing adjustments to cover broader ranges of offenses and
defendants. The fact that such review does exist 20 8 mutes much of
204 Id.
205

Snook, 366 F.3d at 449.

206Id.

207

See supra Part I and notes 48-55.

In fact, the application of this review is not speculative. Following the
Supreme Court decision in Booker, the case was remanded for further
proceedings and the District Court imposed the same sentence. The judge
carefully treated the guidelines as advisory and explained at length why the
guideline sentence was consistent with the statutory sentencing factors and the
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the concern about broadening the application of particular sentencing adjustments because the appellate courts, including the
Supreme Court, can reign in sentencing through their subsequent
opinions."'
For many years, critics have also argued that the sentencing
adjustments in the U.S.S.G. represent double counting or multiple
punishment for a single offense.21 ° The primary concern occurs
where the sentencing process under the U.S.S.G. treats an offense
both as an aggravating feature of one crime and also as an offense
in its own right.21 ' Sentencing courts have frequently been asked to
find the application of the public trust enhancement an impermissible double counting when applied in conjunction with other sentencing adjustments.2 12 Typically, the courts reject this argument.213
Arguments also get raised from time to time that applying the

gravity of the offenses. The defendant again appealed, but, in an unpublished
opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined the District
Court's analysis and stated "[a] guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable
...and there is nothing here to rebut the presumption." United States v.
Booker, No. 05-2318, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 21124 (7th Cir. Sept. 28, 2005).
209 Id. The decision by the Seventh Circuit indicates both that courts will
continue to consult the guidelines when constructing sentences and that appeals
courts will review lower courts' sentencing decisions, based on individual circumstances, for their reasonableness. Measured in this way, one might question
whether there is any harm in expanding the scope and application of the public
trust enhancement. After all, the sentencing decisions will be reviewed by higher
courts, and the presumption of reasonableness granted to a sentence based on
the guidelines can be rebutted by the defendant.
210 Double counting or multiple punishment connotes punishing the defendant
more than one time for a single offense, or in arriving at a total sentence, using
multiple sentencing factors at least some of which are redundant to other
sentencing factors being considered. Cf. Ross, supra note 184, at 267-68.
211

Id. at 268.

212

See, e.g., DeLong, supra note 87, at 354-56 (discussing the Tenth Circuit's

rejection of the double counting argument in UnitedStates v. Clark, No. 91-2059,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 2815 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 1992); the Fifth Circuit's rejection
of the argument in United States v. Hatch, 926 F.2d 387 (1991); and the Second
Circuit's rejection of the argument in United States v. Siciliano, 953 F.2d 939
(1992)).
213 Id.
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public trust enhancement to a base offense level constitutes double
counting for the same offense.214 This criticism misses the mark,
however, because the public trust enhancement section proscribes
application of the enhancement when the base offense level or
specific offense characteristic contemplates or involves an abuse of
trust.2 15 There is a tremendous amount of case law defining the base
offense levels that already include an abuse of trust component.216
Thus, the notion that simply expanding the application of the public
trust enhancement will exacerbate the double counting problem
ignores the reality that the guidelines already contain practical
limits on the type of base offense levels to which the enhancement
may be added.
An additional concern with expanding the application of the
public trust enhancement to the employees and agents of private
regulated entities is that the penalties will fall disproportionately on
lower level employees who can in effect become "scapegoats" for
upper management.2" 7 William Laufer argues that upper management often displays indifference or ignorance toward employee
deviance when that deviance achieves beneficial results for the
corporation. 21' That indifference, however, usually changes to
condemnation when regulators and prosecutors come calling.219
Once the authorities become alerted to the wrongdoing, upper
management's new attitude and behavior can be described as
"reverse whistle blowing. ' 220
Instances of reverse whistle blowing raise questions about
unfairness to lower level employees. That unfairness is greatest
when top management is complicit in employee deviance, or where,
in spite of compliance programs, middle management "tacitly

214 Id.
215

See supranote 4.
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See generally DeLong, supranote 87 (summarizing the case law applying the

public trust enhancement).
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See Laufer, supra note 68, at 658.
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encourages employees" to engage in wrongful conduct beneficial to
the enterprise.221
CONCLUSION

Increasing criminal penalties raise major concerns, including
the question of whether the deterrence justification, offered as a
rationale for expanding the application of the public trust enhancement, really exists.222 In a universe in which the corporate entity
and its most senior management can avoid criminal liability by
scapegoating lower level managers, there is very little actual
incentive effect upon the senior corporate decision-makers that can
come from extending the application of sentencing enhancements
such as the public trust enhancement.
While managers at the most senior levels can, and often do,
avoid criminal liability, front line supervisors and employees will
face strengthened criminal enforcement should the public trust
enhancement extend to the employees and agents of private
regulated entities. 223 There is no doubt that many of these lower
level supervisors and agents responsible for compliance and
reporting know that their actions are criminal, yet they choose to
commit the violations. It would be appropriate to wonder whether
concern about disproportionate sentences falling on low level
employees is overstated. After all, the bottom line is that they are
involved in criminal conduct and there is an element of choice
involved. Such a position, however, does not reflect the practical
realities of the workplace.2 24

221

Senior management may be involved because either they knew offenses were

taking place or took steps to avoid obtaining knowledge of offenses. Id. at 659.
222 See supra Part I notes 36-38, 41-44, 77, and accompanying text (noting that
some think continued noncompliance can be curtailed with stronger criminal
sanctions).
223 See supra Part II, notes 83-97, 100-06 (detailing the operational specifics of
the public trust enhancement as a sentencing adjustment).
224 See, e.g., Laufer, supra note 68, at 658 (discussing how upper level management and officers often tacitly encourage employees to bend rules).
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For the increased penalties to have a deterrent effect on even
the lower level managers and supervisors, these employees must
have knowledge of the increased sanctions, and the sanctions
themselves must be sufficiently severe to overcome the pressures
and incentives present in many workplaces. There is very little
reason to believe that expanding the application of the public trust
enhancement would lead to a dissemination of information to front
line compliance and reporting personnel in a manner that could
produce significant changes in behavior.
Neither the leveling the playing field argument nor the
deterrent effect argument provides a strong independent basis for
expanding the application of the public trust enhancement. 225 The
public trust enhancement would-be, at most, a two level increase in
a defendant's sentence, 226 assuming that a sentencing judge even
chose to apply the enhancement now that the Supreme Court ruled
that the U.S.S.G. are not binding on judges. 227 Even when applied,
a two level sentencing increase is unlikely to provide much of a
deterrent to continued violations. Without the deterrent effect, there
is little hope that the public trust enhancement can contribute
meaningfully to leveling the playing field.228
The arguments that the U.S.S.G. are applied unevenly or
arbitrarily and that the application of another sentencing enhancement would exacerbate the problem of "double counting" are equally
unavailing. Whether expansion of the public trust enhancement
includes the employees or agents of private regulated entities or not,
disparities across the offenses covered by the U.S.S.G., in terms of
the penalties and enhancements levied on individual defendants,
will continue. The U.S.S.G. have long had the objective of limiting
these disparities, but as Professor Barrett and others have pointed
out, there was a tremendous amount of flexibility built into the
guidelines even when they were binding, and the result is often a

225
226
227

See supra Part IV, notes 167-81 and accompanying text.
See supra note 4 (detailing the specific application of the enhancement).
See supraPart I and notes 47-55 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in

the consolidated cases of United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan).
228 See supra Part IV, notes 167, 181 and accompanying text.
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great deal of disparity in sentencing. 29 Now that they are advisory,
there is no reason to believe that sentences will suddenly depart
dramatically from those assigned under the guidelines, or that
sentencing consistency will abruptly materialize.23 °
Perhaps the strongest argument for or against extending the
public trust enhancement beyond its traditional application, is the
concern about scapegoating.231 The defendants most likely to face
enhanced sentences under the public trust enhancement, applied to
the employees and agents of private regulated entities, will be the
lower level supervisors and managers directly charged with the
operation of compliance programs.232 These individuals bear the
primary responsibility for monitoring and reporting to regulatory
authorities. Given the previously mentioned lack of deterrent effect
on corporations and, in particular, high-level decision makers, it
seems unreasonable to subject defendants like Ronald Snook to
more significant jail time than his supervisors.
For the foregoing reasons, federal courts should not follow the
reasoning the Seventh Circuit adopted in Snook. Unfortunately,
there is no case currently on appeal that would allow the Supreme
Court the opportunity to determine the proper scope of the public
trust enhancement. That means that the Circuit split will continue,
and in light of the Supreme Court's decision making the U.S.S.G.
advisory, leaves defendants unable to determine whether their
conduct could subject them to a sentencing enhancement that until
recently was not applicable to them. Judges are now free to either
apply the public trust enhancement or ignore it, leaving defendants
at the mercy of enterprising prosecutors and judges.
Resolving the current Circuit split requires either that a
defendant, sentenced under the public trust enhancement's

229 See supra Part IV.
230

See supra notes 208-09 (discussing how, in the very case striking down

mandatory sentencing guidelines, lower level federal courts consulted the new
advisory guidelines and, on remand, applied the same sentence to the defendant
that he received when the guidelines were binding).
231
232

See supra notes 217-21.
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broadened application, appeal the decision up to the Supreme Court,
or that the U.S. Sentencing Commission amend the U.S.S.G. at
§ 3B1.3 to make clear that the Commission does not view the
employees or agents of a private regulated entity to occupy a
position of public trust.233 Given the uncertainty and time involved
in a case making it on appeal to the Supreme Court, the preferable
method of resolving the circuit split would be a clarifying amendment by the U.S. Sentencing Commission to either endorse the
Seventh Circuit construction or make clear that the public trust
enhancement does not apply to the employees or agents of a private
regulated entity simply because those employees or agents are in a
position to impact public health.
For the reasons outlined earlier, including the concern about
scapegoating of lower level employees without an accompanying
deterrent effect that will enhance compliance, the U.S. Sentencing
Commission should adopt an amendment making it clear that the
public trust enhancement was not intended to increase the sentences of employees or agents of private regulated entities and
should not be used to do so.

See supra note 35, at 2 (noting that the U.S. Sentencing Commission "has the
authority to submit guideline amendments each year to Congress between the
beginning of a regular congressional session and May 1"). Further, "[s]uch
amendments automatically take effect 180 days after submission unless a law
is enacted to the contrary." Id.
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